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Washington, D.C.

TOPIC: Japan. Wireline Communication Facilities of the Japanese Military Attaches at Stockholm and Helsinki.

SUBJECT: Wireline Communication Facilities of the Japanese Military Attaches at Stockholm and Helsinki.

Note: This account is supplementary to the brief general one given on pages 9 and 10 of reference (a), and should therefore be used in conjunction with the latter.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1940 - 1946.

REFERENCE: B-1, except as otherwise indicated.

DISCUSSION:

- (a) Japanese Marine Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe: SSU, 30 September 1946, SS #1235.
- (b) ONODA, Major General Nakoto -- Biographical Sketch of: SSU, 25 September 1946, SS #1236.
- (c) ONODA, Major General Hirose, and MIKOSI, Colonel Michi -- Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 25 September 1946, SS #1237.
- (d) MIKOSI, Yotani (et al) -- Biographical Sketch of: SSU, 27 September 1946, SS #1238.

1. The following information was obtained from indicated subjects of Reference (b), (c) and (d) during their interrogation at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, by a representative of SSU. ONODA's questioning took place between 6 May and 30 July 1944, that of the others between 3 June and 30 July.

2. Page, paragraph and line numbers which are among the subject headings hereinafter used refer to Reference (a), and items appearing beneath such headings may be considered as footnotes to or continuations of corresponding items in Reference (a).

9/Stockholm/1-2

The itinerary of couriers between Tokyo and various points in Europe prior to 22 June 1944 was as follows: Tokyo-Moscow-Berlin-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow-Tokyo (by train); alternately, the same route in reverse. Within Europe couriers made three circuits: (a) Moscow-Helsinki-Stockholm-Moscow (by air); (b) Moscow-Helsinki-Stockholm (by train), returning Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow (by air); (c) the same route in reverse; (d) Stockholm to Berlin, sometimes via Copenhagen (by air).

9/Stockholm/3-5

The diplomatic parties who had received visas to cross Asia traveled by the southern route and entered Europe through Turkey. They carried almost no

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classified documents because of the fear of Soviet intervention. The reasons were the following:

- (a) From Tokyo
 - i. August 1942 - a party of Manchurian diplomats returning from Berlin among them were **HOSEINO** and **YAMASA**.
 - ii. December 1942 - General **BANZAI** with a party of officers.
 - iii. August 1943 - a second party of Manchurian diplomats including **NAKAGAWA**, the Consul from Hamburg. (**ONODA** says that the Manchurians were recalled because there was not enough for them to do in Germany.)
- (b) From Tokyo
 - i. January 1943 - a liaison mission headed by General **OKAMOTO** and including Col. **KOTANI**, Capt. **ONADA** (**IAN**) and **YOSHIMIZU**. They brought some classified material (new codes, etc.) for Berlin but nothing except private mail for Stockholm.
 - ii. November 1943 - a diplomatic party which included **SUSIYA Jun**, who came to take over his post as secretary in the Stockholm Legation. He brought some confidential documents for the Legation itself but none for the Military Attaché's office.

9/Stockholm/2/54

Departures of blockade runners were announced quite frequently from Berlin. Nothing of value was sent by means of them, however, because their arrival was highly uncertain. **ONODA** used them chiefly for personal matters like the sending of presents to his son (those did not arrive).

9/Stockholm/4/1-2

The official Japanese military radio station which had been set up in 1940 in the office of Col. **YOSHINAKA** the Military Attaché in Budapest, was intended to serve as a center where reports from all the Japanese military missions in Europe would be sent for forwarding to Tokyo. Its failure to function successfully was a result of technical difficulties due to the weakness of the transmitter itself, interference from Soviet stations, inexperience on the part of personnel receiving the messages in Tokyo and — according to **ONODA** — the fact that **YOSHINAKA** was not energetic enough.

In the fall of 1942 **ONODA** tried to dispatch a message through the Budapest station. It was sent from Stockholm over a clandestine S/T set operated by Col. **VAN** in the Hungarian Legation, but when it reached Budapest **YOSHINAKA** refused to forward it for the reasons already stated.

A military radio station for the Japanese army was planned in 1939 and a Japanese radio expert named Col. **SASAKI** visited Europe for the purpose of investigating such a plan. He was unsuccessful, however, because no experienced Japanese personnel were available and because the Germans disapproved, offering instead to make their own stations available to the Japanese. The latter considered German facilities insecure from their standpoint and used them only

SATOKI also mentioned to report that he was in contact with a person named **SAKURA** who was a member of the **ONOGARA** group. **1940**
In addition, **SATOKI** mentioned that he was in contact with a person named **MISHINA** who was a member of the **ONOGARA** group.

[illegible]

In June 1945 the Finns agreed to allow all of its communications with Germany over the
4/T set in their location (see below). The arrangement was made with **MOERHOUVEN**
of the Finnish Leg. in view of his close relationship with **WALLMAN**, Third Naval
Attache in Stockholm. Major J. Westlund, Chief of the Finnish Legation in London,
called me and asked of broadcasted. He said that he was the aid of the German Leg.
wanted the plan from being carried out.

ONOUCHI reveals that he at Helsinki came into possession of a German / set at
the time of the realignment between Finland and Germany. CELLARIUS has a 29
reference (a) requested him to do so as it was the only one available for con-
tact between Germany and the Americans. He did so and the set was used by the
Japanese when they landed in ONOUCHI's country. It is so because he had
no Japanese contacts, the set apparently being intended for use by all of them
being INARA at present. ONOUCHI states that he asked CELLARIUS offered to
supply an Estonian contact who would be able to get the set working. He received
news about the set after several months and found the carrier (who was
to pass it off) the / set was turned over to him. The Germans then to
the Japanese, and the set finally arrived in the hands of the latter -
an eventually great embarrassment to ONOUCHI considering their recent break with
the Germans. The problem was solved by the operator, who showed his wife
shortly before she was killed. Soviets. ONOUCHI states that the / set was
never used in the Pacific War or elsewhere. 6-3:10 AM (18) In the Japanese
location. ONOUCHI said that CELLARIUS had been the operator's
salary were taken by URA and that the set was never used.
for free to be destroyed by the Germans.

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ONODERA on Codes, Crypto-analysis and Radio Security

(a) Japanese Military Codes

Two Japanese military ciphers were assigned to ONODERA's office. One was a general system for communication with Tokyo and with all other Japanese Military Attache posts. The other was ONODERA's personal code, a one-time pad for use in connection with Tokyo headquarters only.

Before the arrival of INOUE and other of ONODERA's later assistants, all coding was done by YOSHI (a Japanese refugee businessman) and Mrs. ONODERA. Later all the assistants, both military and civilian, did their share, each being assigned shares for other duty.

The personal one-time pad was the more frequently used because of ONODERA's fear that the other system might have been broken by the Germans and the Swedes (see below), and because toward the end of the war the Stockholm Military Attache's office inherited the one-time pad systems of many Japanese posts which had been closed down; e.g., those at Paris-Vichy, Rome and Berlin.

Sources were indicated in the text of the message either by initials: 'K' for KAWANISHI, 'MA' for MAASUKE, 'P' for PERUKI (HAKKAI) or fully spelled out: 'Swedish General Staff'; 'Finnish Military Attache.' (INOUE — Reference (d) — remembers the following source indicators: 'MA'; 'K'; 'S'; 'Swedish General Staff'; 'Swedish Foreign Office.')

(b) Foreign Codes

On two occasions ONODERA was entrusted with foreign codes for the purpose of communicating with agents. In January 1945 MAASUKE — page 25 of reference (a) — gave him an Estonian code, complete with wave lengths and call signs, for communication with the Baltic countries. Messages were to be sent and received by KALINUS, a crypto-analysis expert of the Finnish refugee group in Sweden, over the N/T net at the Finnish Legation. Earlier, in 1944, SYRKKONEN had given ONODERA a Polish code for communicating with Col. GANQ, the chief of the Polish I.C. in London. ONODERA states that it was never used and that both codes were destroyed in August 1945.

(c) Crypto-analysis

ONODERA never had a Japanese crypto-analyst working in his office. Although his predecessor NISHIMURA had initiated collaboration with HALLANNA and his Finnish I.C. Crypto-analysis Section, that work was carried on during the war by MIROSE in Helsinki (see below). After the Finnish surrender in September 1944 ONODERA purchased some code material from the Finnish refugee group in Stockholm, but his contact was indirect through HALLANNA, PALE or KALINUS. He had other indirect contact with crypto-analytic work through NAYASHI and SAKURAI at Budapest, where the former was Japanese Military Attache and the latter in charge of a small Japanese-Hungarian crypto-analysis section. In general, however, ONODERA did not participate in this aspect of intelligence activity.

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(a) Radio Security

At the beginning of 1945 the Swedish cryptanalyst, Major Sjöström, succeeded in breaking ONODERA's personal code. It was discovered that the list of PALE, chief cryptanalyst of the Finnish Foreign Office, was reportedly divulged to the Americans one-time and then again and finally it obtained from the Finns.

The Swedish radio intercept service was very active at the beginning of 1945 when they discovered and obtained from clandestine W/T equipment which was being operated in the Hungarian and Rumanian legations. ONODERA believes that the Finnish legation did not have throughout the war with Swedish consent.

HIROSE on Japanese cryptanalytic activity in Europe

Before HIROSE left Japan in 1943, the Central Special Intelligence Section of the Japanese General Staff had planned to set up a central cryptanalytic station in Berlin where material would be obtained not only from the Japanese, but also from the Germans. Two civilian experts, TAKAHASHI (who had been with the Kwantung Army) and SEKIMOTO, were preparing to organize this work but were prevented from leaving by the outbreak of the Russo-German war. As a result matters relating to cryptanalysis and monitoring were handled in Berlin by Col. NISHI, who was occasionally assisted by SAKURAI from Budapest.

The only organized Japanese cryptanalytic section was located at the office of the military attaché in Budapest. It was directed by Col. SAKURAI Nobuo, and was assisted by Hungarian officers assigned by the General Staff. The material which they studied was obtained from the Hungarians and perhaps —HIROSE is not sure— from the Germans. When HIROSE visited Budapest in 1943 SAKURAI explained to him that he was greatly handicapped because he received no material from Tokyo, and so HIROSE arranged to send him copies of what he got in Helsinki. He says that SAKURAI's group obtained almost no results with Soviet codes and sent a negligible number of reports to Tokyo. The Hungarian cryptanalysts were handicapped partly by the Finns and SAKURAI never obtained complete cooperation from them.

The staff of SAKURAI's section was composed of the following:

HAGATA Kazumasa, civilian. He was transferred to Berlin in July 1943.
INABA, civilian attached to the Army General Staff. He was transferred.
YOSHIMIZU, civilian formerly attached to the Central Section, Department of the General Staff. In charge of financial and administrative matters.

Col. HORIOCHI. He had been posted to the office in 1940 after leaving his post as Military Attaché in Holland. However, because he was not a trained cryptanalyst and knew much on matters of policy with SAKURAI he was transferred to Stockholm.

At the end of the war, with the Soviets threatening to occupy Hungary, it was planned to set up a cryptanalytic office in the Japanese legation in Bern. SAKURAI was designated as Assistant Military Attaché to Switzerland, but the course of events prevented the plan from being realized.

HIROSE denies that there were any other Japanese cryptanalytic stations in

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Europe. He had never heard of me being connected with the Bucharest mission, and adds that to the best of his knowledge neither the Navy nor the Foreign Office maintained similar services.

After his return to Japan in December 1944, HIRASU's only contact with the European aspect of his specialty came about in 1945 when OMORI informed the General Staff that the Finns had obtained a Russian five digit code book (whether by capture or crypto-analysis, HIRASU does not know). The matter was turned over to HIRASU, who instructed OMORI that SAKURAI should go to Stockholm to receive the book and wire the useful portions to Tokyo and Berlin. SAKURAI did so, and the messages were transmitted to HIRASU who passed them on to the Central Special Intelligence Section. However, the war ended before all the material obtained from the Finns could be forwarded to Tokyo.

[For further material on crypto-analysis and codes see pages 21-22 and 52-53 of Reference (a).]

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